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Abstract
The relationship between perspective taking abilities, political centrism, and outgroup
derogation is not defined at this time. While previous research has demonstrated a
negative relationship between political centrism and outgroup derogation (Van Prooijen,
Krouwel, Boiten, & Eendebak, 2015), the relationship between the other variables is
unclear. Therefore, the current study sought to measure the relationship between (1)
perspective taking abilities and political centrism, (2) perspective taking and outgroup
derogation, (3) political centrism and outgroup derogation and lastly, (4) whether the
relationship between perspective taking abilities and political outgroup derogation would
be mediated by an individual's level of political centrism.
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Chapter I: Literature Review
Currently, the divide between political parties is one of the largest schisms in
America. According to a 2016 survey (Pew Research Center), Americans view politicians
and members of the opposing political party with more anger, fear, and contempt than at
any time in the last 25 years. Fifty-five percent of Democrats surveyed said the
Republican Party makes them “afraid,” while 49% of Republicans reported the same
feelings about the Democratic Party. Further research in 2017 (Pew Research Center),
found that 45% of Republicans and 44% Democrats were willing to express very
unfavorable opinions of the opposing party. It is important to note that these ratings have
more than doubled since 1994, when under 20% of either party were willing to admit to
expressing very unfavorable opinions about the opposing party (2017, Pew Research
Center).
The partisan divide has grown so large that it is surpassing other historical
divisions, as evidenced by a 2015 study that found that partisan discrimination exceeds
racial discrimination in some scenarios (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015). An even more
recent study by Iyengar, and Krupenkin (2018) strengthens these findings. These
researchers found that since the 1980’s, partisan in-group favoritism and outgroup
animosity have become strongly associated with one another, and dislike of the opposing
political party has risen above the level of positive affect we have for our own group.
This high level of disdain for one’s political opponents is causing a great deal of
political animus, and contempt for the other side is a strong motivation for the
participation of many in politics (Iyengar, & Krupenkin, 2018). All too often, voters will
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rally against policies simply because the opposing party is promoting them. While filmed
in a humorous manner, late-night comedian Jimmy Kimmel demonstrated this
phenomenon well in his segment titled “Obamacare vs. Affordable Care Act.” In that
piece, Americans vacillate between support or disapproval of the Affordable Care Act
depending on their party affiliation and which name is used, despite the fact that it is the
same piece of legislation. This anecdotal evidence is strengthened by the results of a 2012
study (Iyengar, Sood, & Lelkes) which suggested that American partisans increasingly
despise each other, but exposure to negative campaign messaging exhibits stronger
effects on division than true differences in policy attitudes.
It is important to attempt to better understand why we have reached such a high
level of political divisiveness. Spohr (2017) argues that recent technological advances
and changing media consumption habits coupled with an increasingly partisan media
landscape are at least partially to blame. Spohr (2017) is not the first to make such a
claim. Sunstein (2001) predicted that the internet will increase political polarization by
allowing individuals to participate in “echo-chambers” in which their current ideals are
reinforced and strengthened and information that is contradictory to one’s worldview is
either ignored or discounted. This idea is essentially an adaptation/evolution of
Festinger’s (1957) concept of selective exposure/cognitive dissonance. Festinger
proposed that people tend to avoid information conflicting with their own ideas and
instead seek out messages they agree with in order to avoid psychological discomfort.
There is evidence that Sunstein’s prediction has come to fruition. Stroud (2010)
found evidence that partisan selective exposure leads to polarization, and that polarization
may lead to selective exposure as well, forming a self-perpetuating cycle of ever-
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increasing partisanship. Also, Nie, Miller, Golde, Butler, and Winneg (2010) found that
in general, individuals who consume news through both the internet and through
television tend to be more partisan than individuals who primarily consume their news
through television, and individuals who only consume news from the internet were the
most partisan of all groups tested. Similarly, Tewksbury and Riles (2015) found a
positive relationship between frequency of online news exposure and disagreements
between Republicans and Democrats on various issues.
It is important to better understand how the internet has caused us to reach this
point. First, social media sites such as Twitter and Facebook are contributing to our
division, and selective exposure is one of the likely mechanisms at work here. For
example, there is evidence that we shield ourselves from political news/information we
do not agree with on social media. Zhu, Skoric, and Shen (2017) report that 15.6% of
respondents in their research either removed content or unfriended individuals during
Hong Kong’s controversial Umbrella Movement protests of 2014. Selective sharing may
be another complementary mechanism driving division as well: Shin and Thorson (2017)
found that partisans selectively share fact-checking messages that agree with and promote
their political views, while ignoring fact-checking messages that would hurt their cause.
Second, while search engines such as Google, Bing, etc. are useful tools most
internet users use to navigate the internet, they are not without their flaws either. Spohr
(2017) argues that due to algorithmic curation and online personalization systems, the
average internet user is rarely exposed to news content that is not aligned with their
personal views. Specifically, on the most popular search engines, algorithms are designed
to prioritize search results that are ideologically similar to our current views and they may
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even exclude results that may oppose our views. This has pushed people into what some
researchers call “filter bubbles” in which ideologically opposing views are filtered out
(Flaxman, Gaol, & Rao, 2016). Concerns regarding filter bubbles have been extended to
Facebook and other social media sites as well, as the algorithms they use to procure
customized content such as videos and news may also limit an individual's exposure to
diverse ideological views. However, while algorithms may be subtly influencing us in
ways we are unaware of, our own personal preferences seem to be the dominant force. A
2015 study (Bakshy, Messing, & Adamic) found that Facebook's algorithm can limit our
exposure to opposing views, however, self-selection had a much stronger effect.
Although search engines, and social media play a role in our news consumption,
they are not necessarily the dominant channels in which news and political information is
consumed online. A 2016 study (Flaxman, et al.,) examined online browsing habits of
active news readers over a period of several months (Active news readers were defined as
internet users who have read at least 10 substantive news articles and at least two opinion
pieces in the three-month timeframe) they found that active news consumers tended to
directly seek out news outlets, and preferred outlets that they agreed with ideologically.
i.e. (conservatives preferred Fox News, liberals Huffington Post). Participants less often
got their news from social media, search engines, or a news aggregator website.
Lastly, although, the internet has been blamed for the rise in negative
partisanship, there are other important factors as well. For much of the 20th century,
television news programs strove to maintain neutrality. This is no longer the case,
television stations such as Fox News cater to a specific political audience (Iyengar, Hahn,
2009). In doing so, they may provide an incomplete set of facts or present biased
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opinions to sway viewers towards a particular position. Viewers who frequently consume
content from these stations may acquire an inaccurate view of the opposing political
party, and/or may easily recall negative information regarding their political opposition
due to availability bias (Spohr, 2017). Unsurprisingly, it has been shown that people tend
to prefer news stations that they perceive to be the most ideologically similar to their own
views. Specifically, Iyengar, Hahn, (2009) found that conservatives tended to prefer Fox
News, while avoiding the news sources of CNN and NPR, while liberal participants
preferred the exact opposite. In another complementary study by Iyengar and Hahn
(2008), researchers found that internet news consumption is often dictated by an
individual's perceived agreement with the organizations ideology, that is, when exposed
to the exact same article headline and image, conservatives were more likely to click on
the link if it was provided by Fox News, whereas liberals strongly avoided Fox News and
sought information from essentially any other source.
Because we are easily able to confirm preconceived biases, and shield ourselves
from information we disagree with, it is possible that individuals are failing or refusing to
consider the perspective of others, which causes us to be more partisan, and to derogate
individuals and groups with beliefs dissimilar to ours. If partisan, agenda driven media is
in fact contributing to political division, it is important to understand some of the
psychological processes that are involved. Understanding these mechanisms will ideally
allow us to utilize our technological resources in a more beneficial manner. Accordingly,
the focus of this review will be to examine the relationship between derogation of
outgroups, perspective taking abilities, and how we align ourselves politically.
Outgroup Derogation
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While unfortunate, the lack of civility in politics is not particularly surprising
given the results of previous research regarding intergroup conflict. Outgroup derogation
is specifically defined as making or seeking negative evaluations of groups that one is not
a member of, or displaying a preference for messages negatively characterizing outgroups
(Jackson, Sullivan, Harnish, & Hodge, 1996). While in-group positivity/favoritism
appears to be a core component of group membership, Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis
(2002), note that outgroup derogation is not a required element. They cite several studies
suggesting that outgroup derogation and intergroup hostility generally arise when
outgroups are associated with strong emotions (e.g., fear). Similarly, Branscombe and
Wann (1994) found that when an individual’s valued social identity was threatened,
derogation of a threat-relevant outgroup elevated collective self-esteem. In simple terms,
we often speak negatively about our rivals when they make us feel insecure about
ourselves and we feel better about our own group after doing so. These effects do not
appear to be unique to America either; a European study found that perceptions of
threatened group interests (i.e. school, culture) were causally antecedent to dislike and
avoidance of foreigners and ethnic minorities. Essentially, perceiving an outgroup or its
members as a threat to one’s own group caused individuals to act and feel negatively
towards the outgroup or to avoid them altogether (Schlueter, Schmidt, & Wagner, 2008).
Given these findings, it should not be surprising that the two sides of the political
spectrum are having difficulty finding common ground. Due to partisan media messaging
(Iyengar, & Hahn, 2009, Levendusky, 2013), both sides may view the other as an
imminent and direct threat to the interests of their own group. Additionally, both sides of
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the political spectrum have suffered electoral defeats in the past several years, which
could potentially make them feel threatened and/or harm their self-esteem.
Perspective Taking
Perspective taking is a broadly defined concept. Ackerman (1996) describes it as
an individual’s ability to experience and describe the presentation of an object or image
from different vantage points. Therefore, perspective taking relates broadly to the
Piagetian concept of egocentrism. Ford (1979) defined egocentrism as “an embeddedness
in one’s own point of view.” This means that prior to a certain stage in development, we
are unable to realize that another individual’s experience of the world is different from
our own. As an example of this phenomenon, when asked to draw an object from the
viewpoint of another person, young children are often unable to do so; instead, they
usually draw the figure from their own visual perspective. However, the ability to draw
from another person’s perspective develops quite early in life, and children usually do not
fail this task by the time they have reached kindergarten (Salatas & Flavell, 1976).
Accordingly, perspective taking is largely the antithesis of egocentrism. While
Ackerman’s (1996) definition is not of central importance to the current research because
it is a quite literal interpretation of perspective taking, involving visual images, as
opposed to purely mental phenomena, it is still relevant because it highlights the fact that
we do not always consider that others have mental experiences that differ from our own.
Underwood and Moore (1982) divide perspective taking into three broad
categories: perceptual, social-cognitive, and affective. However, they note that the
constructs are obviously interrelated and utilize similar internal processes. The perceptual
component of perspective taking is the aspect previously described by Ackerman, which
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involves imagining the visual image another individual is viewing. The social-cognitive
form involves imagining the thoughts or motives of another, while the affective
component involves imagining the feelings or concerns of another. Similarly, Bensalah,
Caillies, and Anduze (2016) divide perspective taking into affective components and
cognitive components as well.
Batson and Ahmad (2009) described two distinct but related forms of perspective
taking: the imagine-self, and the imagine-other perspective. In the imagine-self
perspective, an individual envisions how they personally would think and feel if they
were in another person’s role. In the imagine-other perspective, a person imagines how
the other individual would think and feel given a set of circumstances. The distinction is
subtle, yet important, as the different types of perspective taking have unique
psychological effects. The imagine-self perspective is related to reduced stereotyping and
more positive evaluations of outgroups, while the imagine-other perspective is linked to
increased readiness to help a specific outgroup and increased empathic concern for
specific members of outgroups.
When comparing perspective taking scores with scores on other-oriented and selforiented measures, perspective taking has been shown to be positively correlated with
other-oriented sensitivity, yet negatively correlated with self-oriented sensitivity (Davis,
1980). Davis (1980) notes that this pattern of results suggests that high perspective taking
abilities are mediated by a genuine concern for others feelings and reactions as opposed
to merely being concerned with how one is perceived by others; therefore, perspective
taking should be conceptualized as a dimension of the larger construct of empathy.
Predictably, there are multitudes of studies that describe the relationship between
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perspective taking abilities and prosocial behavior/attitudes. For example, Davis (1983)
found that individuals high in perspective taking ability reported less social dysfunction,
were more socially competent, and exhibited higher levels of self-esteem. Additionally,
Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000) demonstrated that perspective-taking abilities play a role
in reducing social biases. In a series of experiments, they found that higher levels of
perspective taking were related to less stereotyping of outgroup members, increased
overlap between the self and representations of the target group, lower levels of in-group
favoritism, and more positive evaluations of the outgroup.
In addition to being positively correlated with prosocial attitudes, perspective
taking has been found to be related to prosocial behaviors. Shih, Wang, Trahan Bucher,
and Stotzer (2009) found that perspective taking was related to reduced prejudice and
discriminatory behavior against individual members of an outgroup, the authors
hypothesized that this was due to the perspective taking manipulation increasing
participants empathy towards members of the out-group. However, in that research, the
out-group was relatively affectively neutral to the in-group (Asians vs. white Americans).
It would be interesting to explore whether Shihs et al findings extend to outgroups that
elicit very strong negative reactions (e.g. opposing political parties.) There is some
research to suggest that this may be the case, as a 2014 study found that perspective
taking was positively correlated with increased intergroup contact with members of
negatively stereotyped groups (Wang, Kenneth, Ku & Galinsky, 2014). However, this
research examined contact between different social classes, as opposed to differing
political parties. Differing political parties may be more difficult to unite because most
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individuals choose their party affiliation, as Iyengar and Westwood (2015) points out;
this may cause others to “blame” them for their beliefs or behaviors.
Political Centrism
As previously noted, high levels of perspective taking abilities have been
positively correlated with prosocial behaviors and attitudes (Davis, 1983), lower levels of
prejudice (Shih et al., 2009), and increased intergroup contact of negatively stereotyped
groups (Wang et al., 2014). Therefore, it is important that we better our understanding of
how an individual’s perspective taking abilities are involved in their willingness to
cooperate with or listen to members of an opposing political party. Raising perspective
taking abilities may be a key component in decreasing the high levels of animosity both
parties have for each other and could help move American citizens towards a more
centrist position that allows for using the best ideas from both political parties to govern.
Woshinsky (2008) defines political centrism in the following way “centrism is the ideal
or practice of promoting moderate policies that lie between different political extremes.”
He further notes that this is most often conceptualized as part of the one-dimensional
political spectrum of “left-right politics.” A centrist position seems to be associated with
a less emotional approach to politics, as recent research has found that respondents at
both extremes of the political spectrum tend to derogate certain outgroups more heavily
than politically moderate respondents, and experience stronger negative emotions about
politics, such as anger, fear, and disgust as well (Van Prooijen, Krouwel, Boiten, &
Eendebak, 2015).
Rivlin (2018) makes the case that fighting between the two political factions in
the United States is advancing the narrow interests of each group, yet doing little to

11
advance our country, stating: “If the two parties do not work together to find common
ground, we are doomed either to gridlock or wild swings in policy”(“In defense of
centrists,” para. 3). Events such as the passage and attempted repeal of The Affordable
Care Act, the Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2018, or the confirmation of Supreme Court
Justice Brett Kavanaugh are prime examples of the gridlock and policy swings Rivlin
(2018) was referring to, in each scenario, one political party strongly supported the
passage of a bill/confirmation, while the other strongly opposed it, and used all available
means to prevent its passage or confirmation (Gramlich, 2016; Pew Research Center,
2018a, 2018b).
Summary
Numerous studies have shown that perspective taking abilities are related to how
one interacts with others (2016, Shih et al., 2009, Wang et al., 2014). That is, individuals
high in this ability tend not to derogate outgroups and are generally more prosocial (Shih
et al., 2009, Wang et al., 2014, Davis, 1983.) Therefore, an important aim of this study
was measuring if this relationship applies to political outgroups. Another goal was to
measure the relationship between an individual’s perspective taking abilities and their
level of political centrism, due to the fact that centrists by definition are willing to work
with dissimilar people, and see the value in different ideas, they are likely to be high in
perspective taking abilities. Additionally, centrism has previously been shown to be
related to lower levels of outgroup derogation (Van Proijen et al., 2015), that relationship
was retested in this study. Due to this potential relationship, it was predicted that some of
the hypothesized influence of perspective taking on lower levels of outgroup derogation
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would be reduced when simultaneously taking political centrism into consideration (see
Figure 1.).
The current investigation sought to replicate and extend previous research by
examining the relationship between levels of perspective taking, political centrism, and
outgroup derogation, the following hypotheses were tested.
H1: There will be a negative relationship between perspective taking abilities and
outgroup derogation.
H2A: There will be a positive relationship between perspective taking abilities and
political centrism.
H2B: There will be a negative relationship between political centrism and outgroup
derogation.
H3: The negative relationship between perspective taking and outgroup derogation will
be partially mediated by political centrism (see Figure 1).

Political Centrism

Perspective Taking

Outgroup Derogation

Figure 1. Hypothesized relationship between perspective taking, political centrism, and
outgroup derogation.
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Chapter II: Methodology
Participants
Participants were recruited through Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online
crowdsourcing platform that allows researchers and others to recruit individuals to
complete surveys and other tasks for financial compensation and/or other various
incentives. Participation was limited to individuals who voted in the 2016 U.S. election,
and participants received a small amount of financial compensation for their participation
($.50).
The average participant age was 42.5 years old. The sample identified as
approximately 56% male, 42% female, and 2% answering other. Our sample was
overwhelmingly Caucasian, with approximately 81% identifying as non-Hispanic White,
the remainder identified as 9% Asian or Asian American, 7% Hispanic or Latino, and 3%
Black or African American. 128 individuals responded to our survey, however, only 98
provided us with analyzable data due to item omissions. Specifically, 15 individuals did
not attempt the outgroup derogation measure, while the remaining 15 participants only
completed the demographic section or did not even complete that portion of the survey,
rendering their data unable to be used.
Materials
Upon choosing to participate in the survey and providing their consent,
participants completed an online questionnaire (see Appendix I). The first section
contained demographics items assessing age, gender, and racial/ethnic identity.
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Political Centrism The second section contained an item asking participants to
rate themselves on a political scale ranging from 0 (Very Liberal) to 10 (Very
Conservative). The midpoint of that scale (5) indicates political centrism (nonpartisanship), and was used as an “anchor”, thus a score of 5 would be recoded as a 0.
The absolute value of the distance a participant’s response deviated from the midpoint
was then used to indicate a participant’s level of centrism, thus, lower scores reflected
greater levels of political centrism. In this section, we also included a screening question
asking participants to indicate their political opposition. Participants who were vague
about their opposition were excluded from analysis.
Perspective Taking The third section of the questionnaire contained the
Perspective Taking Scale, a subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis,
1980, 1983) According to its author; the perspective taking (PT) scale measures the
reported tendency to spontaneously adopt the psychological point of view of others in
everyday life. The Perspective taking scale of the IRI contains seven Likert-scale items.
Response options to the IRI ranged from A (does not describe me well) to E (describes
me very well). Response options were coded to reflect a numerical score, and higher
overall scores reflected greater levels of perspective taking ability.
Outgroup Derogation This questionnaire is a version of a scale previously used
to assess intergroup attitudes between a sample of African American and Jewish
individuals (Fiebert, Horgan, & Peralta,1999), shortened and slightly modified to assess
the attitudes individuals hold towards their political opposition. Response options were
coded to reflect a numerical score, with higher scores indicating higher levels of outgroup
derogation.
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Procedure
After being recruited from the Mturk website, participants were required to
provide informed consent, participants were then directed to an online survey delivered
using Lyceum Survey. They completed the measures described above. Upon completion
of the surveys, participants were then directed to a debriefing page disclosing the
purposes and hypotheses of the study and providing contact information to allow
participants to request a report of the research findings from the researchers.
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Chapter III: Results
Both political centrism and outgroup derogation exhibited positively skewed
distributions but applying standard transformations (logarithmic and square root) did not
substantively reduce this deviation from normality. Bootstrapping (performed to test H3)
did not change the significance of any of the pathways in the mediation model.
Hypotheses H1 was tested using a linear regression, in that analysis perspective
taking was used as a predictor variable of political centrism.
Hypothesis H2A, and H2B were analyzed using separate linear regressions in
which perspective taking and political centrism were used as predictors of outgroup
derogation.
We also tested Hypothesis 3; whether political centrism (non-partisanship)
partially mediates the effect of perspective taking on outgroup derogation. This mediation
model was tested with a path analysis using the Lavaan package in R version 3.6.0.
Results
Means, standard deviations, and reliability alphas (Cronbach) appear in Table 1.
Correlations among the variables are shown in Table 2. The three hypotheses were tested
via three linear regression analyses in which perspective taking and political centrism
were incorporated as predictor variables of outgroup derogation, and perspective taking
was tested as a predictor of political centrism.
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Table 1
Means, Standard Deviations, and Cronbach’s Alphas for the Dependent Measures
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Measure

Mean

SD

Alpha

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------PIQS

2.92

1.64

PTT

25.67

5.85

.88

ODQCT

31.38

6.07

.91

ODQLT

26.95

6.58

.95

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Note: PIQS= Level of centrism; PTT = Perspective taking total; ODQCT = Outgroup
derogation conservative total; ODQLT = Outgroup derogation liberal total

Table 2
Correlations Among the Variables
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------PIQS
PTT
ODQT
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------PIQS

--

PTT

.09

--

ODQT

.17

-.04

--

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Note: PIQS = Level of centrism; PTT = Perspective taking total; ODQT = Outgroup
derogation total.
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The first regression explored the relationship between participants’ level of
perspective taking abilities and outgroup derogation. The effect of the predictor variables
was not significant, F(1, 96) = .17, p = .68, inconsistent with Hypothesis 1, perspective
taking did not account for a significant proportion of unique variance of outgroup
derogation (t = -.41, p =.68).
The second regression examined the relationship between political centrism and
outgroup derogation. Contrary to expectations, level of centrism was found to not be a
significant predictor of outgroup derogation, F(1, 96) = 2.79, p = .10 (t = 1.67, p = .10).
Thus, Hypothesis 2 was not supported either.
A third linear regression was performed to examine the relationship between an
individual’s perspective taking abilities, and their level of political centrism. The
relationship between perspective taking and an individual’s level of centrism was found
to be non-significant as well, F(1, 96) = .71, p = .40 (t = .84, p = .40).
Finally, a mediation analysis was conducted using the R package lavaan. This
type of mediation analysis uses maximum likelihood estimation to compute parameter
estimates for all paths simultaneously. Results for this analysis are depicted in Figure 2.
No paths were significant.
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Political Centrism
.37 (.59)

.10 (.02)

Perspective Taking

0.08 (.11)

Outgroup Derogation

Figure 2. Relationship between perspective taking, political centrism, and outgroup
derogation.
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Chapter IV: Discussion
In this research it was hypothesized that perspective taking and political centrism would
have a positive relationship with each other, and that these variables would each have a
negative relationship with outgroup derogation, as well. We also hypothesized that the
relationship between perspective taking and outgroup derogation would be partially
mediated by political centrism. When tested, however, these relationships were not found
among the variables.
Although, previous studies have found a connection between perspective taking
and outgroup derogation (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000), as well as centrism and
outgroup derogation (Van Prooijen, et al., 2015), the current research did not attain the
same results. Additionally, the hypothesized relationship between perspective taking and
political centrism was not found. There are multiple possibilities why the current study
did not achieve the hypothesized results. Most importantly, due to time and financial
constraints we were unable to gather data from a large sample of individuals. Although
128 individuals responded to our survey, only 98 provided us with analyzable data due to
item omissions and other data issues. This limited our statistical power to find significant
results.
Sampling issues aside, it is important to consider other important factors that may
have affected our research. As noted by Iyengar and Westwood (2015), political
affiliations are not like racial or class boundaries, we make a conscious decision to join a
political party. Because we chose to be a member of our party, as opposed to being born
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into it, individuals with the opposite political affiliation may be less understanding or
sympathetic of our behaviors and beliefs. It is also noteworthy that partisans are more
affectively polarized against one another than many groups previously sampled in
perspective taking research, making them more likely to derogate their opposition
(Hewstone et al., 2002). Previous research has used relatively neutral groups when
examining perspective taking and intergroup relations, for example (Galinsky &
Moskowitz, 2000) relied upon the minimal group paradigm to define an outgroup in their
research. Finally, much of the previous research that has found a positive relationship
between perspective taking and prosocial behavior required participants to complete
some sort of task to prime or enhance perspective taking abilities, for example Wang et
al., (2014), required participants to complete an essay of a day in the life of an outgroup
member before measuring intergroup contact between outgroups. Our study differed in
that it only contained a self-report measure of perspective taking abilities and did not
encourage participants to see things from the opposition's point of view before measuring
outgroup derogation. It is important not to overlook psychological reactivity and demand
characteristics as determinants of the outcome of this research either. It is well
established that research subjects tend to alter their behavior when under observation
(McCarney et al., 2007), and our hypotheses may have been fairly obvious to the
participants, this is most likely to have caused them to answer in ways they thought
would confirm our hypotheses (Nichols, Maner, 2008).
Despite the current research failing to find a link between perspective taking
abilities, political centrism, and the derogation of one's political opposition, there is a
dearth of research demonstrating that perspective taking abilities are related to positive
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attitudes and behaviors (Wang et al., 2014, Shih et al., 2009). As well as research
suggesting that centrists experience fewer negative emotions than partisans (Van Proijen
et al., 2015). Researchers seeking to continue this research would likely benefit from
sampling a larger selection of participants due to the likely small effect of the predictor
variables and trying to gather a sample that more accurately represents the American
electorate. The procedure of soliciting participants through random address and phone
number sampling used by the American National Election Survey (ANES) seems to be
the gold standard for political research (DeBell, Amsbary, Meldener, Brock & Maisel,
2018), if feasible this or a similar procedure would be ideal as it would gather a more
representative sample. Future studies may also want to include a question asking
participants to attempt to identify the studies hypotheses, our study hypotheses may have
been obvious to participants, leading participants to answer in socially desirable ways.
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Appendix I: IRB Approval Letter
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Appendix II: Measures
Demographics
1. How do you describe yourself? (Check one) Male __ Female __ Other __
2. What is your age? ___
3. How would you describe yourself? (Check one) American Indian or Alaska
Native __ Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander __ Asian or Asian American __
Black or African American __ Hispanic or Latino __ Non-Hispanic White
(Caucasian) __ Other __
Political affiliation scale
Please indicate where you would fall on a scale of political affiliation.
() Strong Democrat
() Weak Democrat
() Lean Democrat
() Independent
() Lean Republican
() Weak Republican
() Strong Republican
Political Opposition Question
Please indicate the political group that you consider to be your "opposition"
() Liberals
() Conservatives
() Other (Please indicate group in the space provided below)
Political ideology scale
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In politics, people sometimes talk about Liberal and Conservative. Where would you place
YOURSELF on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means very Liberal and 10 means very
Conservative?
() 0-Very Liberal
() 1
() 2
() 3
() 4
() 5
() 6
() 7
() 8
() 9
() 10-Very Conservative
Perspective Taking Scale
For each item, indicate how well it describes you by choosing the appropriate letter on
the scale: A (does not describe me well, B, C, D, or E (describes me well). READ EACH
ITEM CAREFULLY BEFORE RESPONDING. Answer as honestly as you can.
1) I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view.
A) Does not describe me well __ B) __ C) __ D) __ E) Describes me well __
2) I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision.
A) Does not describe me well __ B) __ C) __ D) __ E) Describes me well __
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3) I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look
from their perspective.
A) Does not describe me well __ B) __ C) __ D) __ E) Describes me well __
4) If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other
people's arguments.
A) Does not describe me well __ B) __ C) __ D) __ E) Describes me well __
5) I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.
A) Does not describe me well __ B) __ C) __ D) __ E) Describes me well __
6) When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while.
A) Does not describe me well __ B) __ C) __ D) __ E) Describes me well __
7) Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their
place.
A) Does not describe me well __ B) __ C) __ D) __ E) Describes me well __
Outgroup Derogation Scale
Please answer the following questions with regards to the political group you affiliate the
least with. I.e. If you identify as a conservative/lean conservative, answer these questions
with liberals in mind, and vice-versa. Individuals with no political affiliation should apply
statements to both parties.
1. Liberals (Conservatives) have too much power in the U.S.
() Strongly agree, () agree, () disagree, () strongly disagree
2. Liberals (Conservatives) are warm and friendly people.
() Strongly agree, () agree, () disagree, () strongly disagree
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3. Liberals (Conservatives) are more willing than most to use shady practices to get
what they want.
() Strongly agree, () agree, () disagree, () strongly disagree
4. Liberals (Conservatives) stick together too much.
() Strongly agree, () agree, () disagree, () strongly disagree
5. Liberals (Conservatives) don’t care what happens to anyone but their own kind.
() Strongly agree, () agree, () disagree, () strongly disagree
6. The more contact a person has with Liberals (Conservatives) the more they get to
like them.
() Strongly agree, () agree, () disagree, () strongly disagree
7. Liberals (Conservatives) are too pushy.
() Strongly agree, () agree, () disagree, () strongly disagree
8. Do you feel that Liberals (Conservatives) are trying to get ahead at the expense of
people like you?
() Strongly agree, () agree, () disagree, () strongly disagree
9. I try to avoid socializing with Liberals (Conservatives).
() Strongly agree, () agree, () disagree, () strongly disagree
10. I would not feel comfortable if most of my coworkers were Liberals
(Conservatives). () Strongly agree, () agree, () disagree, () strongly disagree
11. I would not mind if my immediate supervisor at work was Liberal (Conservative).
() Strongly agree, () agree, () disagree, () strongly disagree
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